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Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally 
expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness.  However, this argument ignores 
potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising 
from agency problems.  Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized 
by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple 
measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family 
firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts, ceteris paribus.  This 
result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits in order to avoid the 
non-tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders‟ 
concern with family rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities (Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006). This inference is further strengthened by our finding that family firms 
without long-term institutional investors (as outside monitors) and family firms expecting 
to raise capital exhibit even lower tax aggressiveness.  Our result is also consistent with 
family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage 
from an IRS audit than non-family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a 
small sample of tax shelter cases. 
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The government (federal, state and local) takes a greater than one-third share of a 
firm‟s pre-tax profits. Given the significance of this tax cost to the firm and shareholders, 
it might be expected that tax aggressiveness is desired by shareholders.  However, this 
argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressive activities 
(Scholes et al. 2005).  In this paper, we study the implications of non-tax cost 
considerations arising from the unique agency conflict in family firms for their tax 
management activities. Specifically, we investigate whether family firms are more or less 
tax aggressive than non-family firms.1 
  As is common in the literature, we define family firms as firms where members of 
the founding family continue to hold positions in top management, are on the board, or 
are blockholders of the company.2  Founding family presence implies a greater agency 
conflict between large and minority shareholders and a smaller agency conflict between 
owners and managers as compared to non-family firms. The nature and extent of agency 
conflicts, such as the costs arising from hidden actions of managers, can affect the level 
of tax aggressiveness. Accordingly, prominent researchers (Scholes et al. 2005; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2004, 2006) call for more research to examine tax aggressiveness within an 
agency context. The different agency conflicts in family firms versus non-family firms 
enable us to examine this issue.  
                                                 
1 Consistent with existing research (e.g., Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2006), we define tax aggressiveness as 
downward management of taxable income through tax planning activities. Tax aggressiveness in our paper 
encompasses tax planning activities that are legal, or that may fall into the gray area, as well as activities 
that are illegal. Thus, tax aggressive activities do not necessarily indicate that the firm has done anything 
improper.  Further, we use the term tax aggressiveness throughout the paper but the term can be used 
interchangeably with tax avoidance and tax management.  
2 We also examine a stricter definition of family firms in which we classify firms as family firms only if the 
family‟s equity holdings are at least five percent. Under this definition 32.3% of the firms are classified as 
family firms.  As reported below, we find qualitatively similar results. 
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In addition, in their review of the empirical tax literature, Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) point out that insider control and other organizational factors, such as ownership 
structure, are important, but under-studied, determinants of tax aggressiveness.3 We fill in 
the void by examining the impact of founding family ownership on tax aggressiveness. 
The presence of the founding family leads to a different ownership structure compared to 
non-family firms and thus provides a unique setting to examine the impact of insider 
control on tax aggressiveness activities. Lastly, family firms are an important component 
of the economy – 32% to 46% of S&P 1500 firms are classified as family firms 
depending on the definition of family firms – and are thus of interest in their own right.  
To determine the level of tax aggressiveness, firms trade off the marginal benefits 
against the marginal costs of managing taxes. The marginal benefits include greater tax 
savings, whereas the marginal costs include the potential penalty imposed by the IRS, 
implementation costs (time/effort and transaction costs of implementing tax transactions), 
and agency costs accompanying tax aggressive activities (including rent extraction). 
Desai and Dharmapala (2004, 2006) argue that the critical characteristics of tax 
aggressive activities are complexity and obfuscation. Such complexity could be used to 
mask rent extraction, such as earnings management, related-party transactions, and other 
perquisite consumption behavior.4  If this is the case, shareholders will price protect 
                                                 
3 Prior literature has examined the role of firm size and industry membership in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in corporate tax burdens (often defined as either the current effective tax rate or total 
effective tax rate). See, for example, Siegfried (1974), Stickney and McGee (1982), Zimmerman (1983), 
Shevlin and Porter (1992), and Gupta and Newberry (1997). For recent studies with an emerging interest in 
tax aggressiveness, see Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2005) and Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2007). Most 
of these studies were motivated by fairness/equity issues – the distribution of tax burdens across firms. 
4 For example, when investigating Enron‟s tax management activities, the Joint Committee on Taxation 
(JCT) found that Enron treated its tax department as another profit center to manufacture fake accounting 
earnings with no tax benefit, while paying a significant transaction fee (real cash outflow) in the process.  
As an example of related party transactions, Andrew Fastow, Enron‟s CFO, was a key owner in some of the 
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themselves in an efficient capital market. That is, the potential rent extraction of tax 
aggressiveness, while beneficial to the decision maker, comes with a non-tax cost: a price 
discount on the firm‟s stock imposed by external shareholders.  This non-tax cost is 
particularly poignant in family firms due to their larger dominant-small shareholder 
conflict: family owners have greater opportunities for rent extraction, but at the same 
time non-family shareholders, anticipating self-dealing, can penalize family members‟ 
self-dealing by discounting the share price. 
Under the ceteris paribus condition, the difference between family and non-family 
firms in tax aggressiveness depends on the impact of the differential characteristics of 
family owners versus managers in non-family firms on the benefits and costs of tax 
aggressiveness. Because family owners have substantially higher holdings, they benefit 
more from tax savings or rent extraction that can be concealed by tax aggressive 
activities, but at the same time, the potential price discount is also more costly for them. 
In addition, due to their much larger equity ownership and their much longer investment 
horizons, family owners are more concerned with the potential penalty imposed by the 
IRS and the reputation damage from being involved in a tax related lawsuit. Thus, both 
the benefits and costs appear to be higher for family owners than for managers in non-
family firms. Accordingly, ex ante, it is unclear whether family firms will be more or less 
tax aggressive than non-family firms, and we examine this issue empirically. 
To examine the tax aggressiveness of firms, we rely on multiple measures of tax 
aggressiveness drawn from the literature. Specifically, we use two effective tax rate 
measures and two book-tax difference measures: effective tax rate (defined as total tax 
                                                                                                                                                 
notorious SPEs that transferred resources from Enron to the SPEs, with himself as the primary beneficiary 
(McLean and Elkind 2003). 
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expense divided by pretax book income), cash effective tax rate (cash tax paid divided by 
pretax book income), the book-tax difference measure advanced by Manzon and Plesko 
(2002), and a residual book-tax difference measure developed in Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006). Firms that are more tax aggressive have lower effective tax rates and higher 
book-tax differences than other firms. As an additional test, we also use a factor analysis 
to extract one common factor from these four measures.  
Using 3,865 firm-year observations from S&P 1500 firms in the period 1996-2000, 
we document that family firms exhibit lower tax aggressiveness than their non-family 
counterparts, as demonstrated by their higher effective tax rates and lower book-tax 
differences.5 This result holds both before and after we control for firm characteristics 
that are cross-sectionally associated with our tax aggressiveness measures: firm 
performance, leverage, loss carry forward, foreign income, tangible and intangible assets, 
equity income, firm size, market to book ratio, and industry fixed effects. Including these 
controls ensures that the documented difference in tax aggressiveness between family and 
non-family firms is not driven by fundamentals.  For example, firms with loss carry 
forward will have a lower tax rate than other firms.  Since on average family firms 
perform better than non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003), family firms will 
appear to have a higher tax rate and be less tax aggressive.  However, such a difference is 
not due to tax planning of non-family firms or lack of tax planning in family firms.  
Controlling for those firm characteristics mitigates the concern that correlated omitted 
                                                 
5 Endogeneity is unlikely to be of critical concern in our setting, as it is unlikely that firms‟ tax 
aggressiveness prompts families to maintain or relinquish their holdings. However, assuming most firms 
start out with founders controlling the firm, there is the issue of why some firms continue to have family 
ownership/control while others do not. This self selection issue introduces a potential omitted correlated 
variable problem as some of the determinants might affect tax aggressiveness. To address this issue, we 
include a comprehensive list of controls. In particular, in the main tests we control for growth, size, and 
firm performance, and in a sensitivity test we further control for firm age, which are correlated with firm 
choice (family versus non-family firms). 
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variables explain our results.  Note that including those characteristics admittedly 
controls for some of the tax aggressive mechanisms.  However, doing this simply 
controls for the average tax effects associated with these variables (e.g., firms with more 
foreign income on average have lower ETRs), and leaves much room to capture cross-
sectional variation in firms‟ tax planning activities (e.g., for firms with foreign 
operations, more tax aggressive firms will be more aggressive in transfer pricing to shift 
income).  Our family firm variables also capture the difference between family firms and 
non-family firms in tax planning through means such as state tax planning, tax shelters, 
use of flow though entities, and use of off-balance-sheet financing, to name just a few. 
We provide a detailed discussion in Section 3.3.  
We further document that family firms without long-term institutional investors (as 
outside monitors) and family firms expecting to raise capital exhibit even lower tax 
aggressiveness. These results are consistent with family owners in these firms having 
even stronger incentives to reduce the perception of family entrenchment: family firms 
are willing to forgo tax savings in order to avoid the associated price discounts. In 
addition, we conduct many sensitivity tests and obtain similar inferences. Our results are 
robust to the alternative explanation of differential firm sophistication and hold after 
controlling for outside blockholder ownership and CEO ownership. We obtain similar 
inferences when using a sample of tax shelter cases. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, our evidence 
provides an important step toward a better understanding of the impact of equity 
ownership and agency conflict on firms‟ tax reporting practices. Prior research generally 
focuses on the differences in firms‟ tax reporting between private and public companies 
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in a few selected industries, such as banks and insurers (e.g., Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock 
1996; Beatty and Harris 1999; Mikhail 1999; Mills and Newberry 2001; Hanlon, Mills, 
and Slemrod 2005). The general conclusion of these studies is that private companies are 
more tax aggressive. In contrast, we examine public firms (S&P1500 firms) with diverse 
industry membership and employ proxies that capture the overall tax aggressiveness. 
Thus, our evidence can be generalized to a greater section of the economy. Interestingly 
we find family firms to be less tax aggressive. While family firms are similar to private 
firms in the concentration of ownership of selected individuals, the public nature of 
family firms gives rise to unique agency conflicts that can lead to differential non-tax cost 
concerns and hence differential tax aggressiveness.   
To reconcile our findings with prior studies, we examine the banking industry 
further. We compare the tax aggressiveness of public family banks, public non-family 
banks, and private banks. (We focus on banks because financial data for private firms in 
other industries are not readily available.) Using both univariate and multivariate 
analyses, we find that private banks are the most tax aggressive, followed by public non-
family banks, and then by public family banks. This reconciles our findings with prior 
research and is consistent with our conjecture that different agency problems and 
reputation concerns faced by private firms (as opposed to public family firms) lead to 
different tax aggressiveness.   
Second, we extend the family firm literature by examining the impact of founding 
family presence on tax aggressiveness. Our evidence also corroborates Desai and 
Dharmapla‟s (2004, 2006) argument and highlights the importance of taking into 
consideration (1) the complementarity between tax-avoidance activities and rent 
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extraction, and (2) the non-tax costs arising from the greater agency conflicts between 
large and small shareholders in family firms in studying the tax aggressiveness of family 
firms.  Our results show that the non-tax costs arising from agency conflicts can have a 
significant impact on these firms‟ tax management activities.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review related 
literature and develop our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our sample and research 
design. Sections 4 and 5 present our main results and corroborating evidence, and Section 
6 reports additional analyses. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
Taxes represent a significant cost to the company and a reduction in cash flows 
available to the firm and shareholders, leading to firms‟ and shareholders‟ incentives to 
reduce taxes through tax aggressive activities.  However, it is simplistic to assume that 
tax aggressive activities always lead to firm value maximization as there are potential 
costs of being tax aggressive, including non-tax costs arising from managers‟ hidden 
actions (Scholes et al. 2005).  Tax aggressiveness also creates lost tax revenues to the IRS 
and additional regulatory costs to the SEC, as firms can utilize the opaqueness of tax 
saving transactions to mask earnings management (Desai and Dharmapala 2004, 2006). 
Despite the important implications of tax planning for shareholders and regulators, our 
understanding of the determinants of tax reporting aggressiveness is limited. In particular, 
as pointed out in Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), managerial or insider control of a firm 
is potentially an important determinant of tax aggressiveness, but there is little research 
on this issue. Scholes et al. (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006) also call for more 
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research of tax management in the presence of agency conflicts.  We fill this gap by 
examining the impact of family ownership and control on tax aggressiveness.  
2.1. Costs and benefits of being tax aggressive 
A benefit to one party can be a cost to another party. To streamline the discussion, 
we take the perspective of the party that presumably determines the extent of tax 
aggressiveness: family owners in family firms and CEOs in non-family firms. 6 In this 
section, we discuss the costs and benefits of tax aggressiveness, and in the next section, 
we discuss how they differ across these two groups of firms. 
When determining tax aggressiveness, decision makers tradeoff the benefits and 
costs. The most obvious benefit of tax aggressiveness is greater tax savings. While such 
savings accrue to shareholders, managers also benefit if they are compensated, directly or 
indirectly, by shareholders for their efforts in effective tax management. Another 
potential benefit of tax aggressiveness to the decision makers, i.e., managers and family 
owners, is rent extraction that can be both enabled and masked by opaque tax avoidance 
activities. Rent extraction refers to non-value maximizing activities decision makers 
pursue at the expense of shareholders, including aggressive financial reporting, perk 
consumptions, and related party transactions. Desai and Dharmapala (2004, 2006) model 
the complementary relation between rent extraction and tax avoidance. They point out 
that tax-avoidance activities, such as seeking off-shore tax havens or creating complex 
structures involving tax-indifferent related parties, often comprise very complex 
transactions that are designed to obscure the underlying intent and to avoid detection by 
the IRS. Examples of complicated tax transactions include contested liability acceleration 
                                                 
6 Family owners often act as CEOs in family firms; even when they are not CEOs, we assume that family 
owners‟ influence of and involvement in firm management can tilt the firms‟ decisions to their preference. 
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strategy, cross-border dividend capture, and offshore intellectual property havens (e.g., 
Graham and Tucker 2006). The obscure nature of such tax aggressiveness activities 
makes it easier for managers/family owners to hide rent extraction activities.  
Enron offers a stylized example of manufacturing earnings through tax 
aggressiveness activities; a report by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) of the US 
Congress (2003) provides detailed analysis of how Enron manufactured accounting 
earnings through extensive use of tax shelters that led to essentially no incremental tax 
benefit.7 Similarly, Dynergy engaged in a series of complicated tax transactions to 
mislead investors about its financial performance.  Specifically, Dynergy, through tax 
transactions with third parties, intentionally misclassified a temporary financing cash 
inflow as operating cash flows so as to mislead investors about the quality of their 
accounting earnings.8 Such aggressive financial reporting benefits managers or insiders 
as it can lead to higher executive compensation or temporarily increase stock price 
allowing private gains from insider trading (Cheng and Warfield 2005). When controlling 
a separate business, insiders can also benefit themselves by buying assets at a higher 
price than the market price from, paying excessive consulting fees to, or borrowing 
money at higher interest rates from, their controlled business. All these activities can be 
promoted as saving taxes for the company of interest. In fact, in an effort to reduce tax 
                                                 
7 For example, through one of its tax transactions named “Project Steele,” Enron paid over $11 million in 
fees in order to generate $133 million in pretax financial income, though it would not have to pay taxes 
well into the future through previous tax shelters. Based on extensive analyses, the JCT concluded that 
“Enron looked to its tax department to devise transactions that increased financial income. In effect, the tax 
department was converted into an Enron business unit, complete with annual revenue targets. The tax 
department, in consultation with outside experts, then designed transactions to meet or approximate the 
technical requirements of tax provisions with the primary purpose of manufacturing financial statement 
income.” See Desai and Dharmapala (2004) for more details. 
8 In order to obscure their underlying intent, Dynergy prepared two sets of records separately for their 
accountant and other parties involved in the funding of their 2001 tax sheltering transactions. See Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) for more details. 
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shelter activities, many states recently enacted laws that disallow deductions for interests 
and intangible expenses paid to related parties (Schadewald 2005).  
On the cost side, one important cost of tax aggressiveness is the potential penalty 
imposed by the IRS, which is the product of the probability of being audited and being 
found out by the IRS and the expected penalties once found out.9 Another significant 
non-tax cost to the decision maker is the potential price discount imposed by other 
shareholders if they perceive that decision makers use tax aggressiveness to extract rents 
(Desai and Dharmapala 2006). The complementarity of tax aggressiveness and rent 
extraction and the obscure nature of tax transactions make it extremely difficult for 
shareholders to disentangle these two incentives, and accordingly they will price protect 
themselves and bid the firm price down.10 Consistent with this notion, Desai, Dyck, and 
Zingales (2007) find that firms targeted by increased tax enforcement in Russia 
experience an increase in market value.  This suggests that even though tax aggressive 
activities save investors cash, investors are aware of the potential managerial self-dealing 
and react favorably to regulatory actions that prevent managers from transferring 
corporate resources through tax transactions.   
                                                 
9 The cost of tax aggressiveness also includes invested time/effort and the transaction costs of tax planning 
activities. The former is likely similar across family and non-family firms, and for the latter, one can think 
of tax savings as net savings after transaction costs. Another cost of tax aggressiveness is lower reported 
earnings, which can occur due to either implicit taxes and/or book-tax conformity. To the extent that family 
owners are less concerned with near-term reported earnings, family firms are expected to be more tax 
aggressive. 
10 Shareholders can detect firms‟ extent of tax aggressiveness through a variety of means. For example, 
they can observe ETRs and book-tax differences and they have access to press discussions about firms‟ tax 
practices. 
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2.2. Implications of ownership characteristics and agency conflicts for family firms’ tax 
aggressiveness 
Whether family firms exhibit more or less tax aggressiveness than non-family firms 
depends on whether the above benefits and costs are more substantial for family owners 
than for managers in non-family firms.  Relative to managers in non-family firms, family 
owners have larger ownership, longer investment horizons, and greater reputation 
concerns. In addition, due to family owners‟ high ownership, family firms differ from 
non-family firms in that they have (1) greater owner-manager incentive alignment and 
thus lower owner-manager conflict, but (2) bigger agency conflicts between dominant 
and small shareholders.  These unique characteristics of family firms all suggest that both 
the costs and the benefits of being tax aggressive are higher for family firms.  Below we 
detail our reasoning. 
The potential benefits are larger for family owners than for managers in non-family 
firms for several reasons. First, family owners have much higher ownership than 
professional CEOs and thus they capture more of the tax savings. Among S&P 1500 
family firms, the founding family on average owns more than 18% of the outstanding 
equity. In contrast, the average CEO ownership is less than 1% in non-family firms. 
Second, of all family firms, more than 60% are managed by a family member and over 
98% of the families have at least one family member sitting on the board of directors. 
Family owners‟ greater influence provides the founding family with more opportunities 
to seek rents, through transactions such as tax avoidance activities and related party 
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transactions. Thus, the potential private benefits from rent extraction can also be bigger 
for family owners than for managers in non-family firms.11 
Higher benefits of tax aggressiveness to family owners would imply that family 
firms are more tax aggressive than non-family firms, if the costs are similar across the 
two groups. However the costs of being tax aggressive are higher for family firms due to 
family firms‟ unique agency conflicts. As discussed above, while having a lower 
manager-owner agency conflict, family firms face a larger agency conflict between 
dominant and smaller shareholders. Accordingly, the cost of aggressively managing taxes 
– the price discount arising from minority shareholders‟ perception of insiders‟ 
entrenchment – is higher.  Family owners‟ large and under-diversified equity positions 
imply that the cost of a price discount has a larger impact on family owners‟ wealth than 
on managers in non-family firms.  
In addition, the potential penalty imposed by the IRS is likely more substantial to 
family owners than to CEOs in non-family firms, because family owners are under-
diversified and have their wealth tied disproportionately to their firms.12  Also, there is 
generally a long lag between the design/implementation of tax transactions and the 
detection by the IRS. Given that managers‟ horizon tends to be shorter than that of family 
owners, it is easier for them to avoid the long-run consequences of an IRS audit and 
                                                 
11 The saga surrounding the fall from grace of the founders of Adelphia provides a good example of family 
rent extraction.  The SEC alleges that John Rigas, founder and CEO of the now bankrupt cable TV 
company, Adelphia Communications, and his two sons Timothy Rigas and Michael Rigas who served as 
senior executives, diverted firm resources for personal use: they asked the company to pay out over $252 
million to satisfy margin calls against the Rigas family brokerage accounts, they used fraudulent documents 
and misleading accounting tricks to obtain more than $420 million in Adelphia stock for the Rigas family, 
without paying a dime, they asked the company to spend more than $13 million on building a golf course 
on John Rigas‟ land, and they forced the company to pay for airplanes and luxury apartments for the 
personal use of the Rigas family unrelated to Adelphia‟s business. 
12 When William Lauder, grandson of the company founder of Estee Lauder, recently stepped down, he 
made the following comment: “I am committed to the company. It‟s the vast majority of my personal 
wealth and my family‟s personal wealth – and we fully expect to be actively involved with this company 
going forward (The Wall Street Journal Nov 9, 2007, „Lauder Scion Way Out, P&G Executive Way In‟).” 
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detection. In contrast, it is more difficult for family owners to avoid such penalties due to 
their much longer holding horizons.13  
Family owners also have incentives to protect the reputation of the “family name” 
since they generally view their firms as legacies to be passed on to the next generations, 
not wealth to be consumed during their lifetime (Casson 1999). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that family firms are concerned about the political impact of being labeled as tax 
aggressive.14  These concerns suggest that family owners have higher incentives to avoid 
any negative publicity from an IRS audit of tax strategies. Consistent with family owners‟ 
greater reputation and litigation concerns, Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008) find that 
although family firms on average provide less voluntary disclosure than non-family 
firms, they are more likely to give earnings warnings to preempt the negative publicity 
that can result from not issuing warnings.  
Overall, although the benefits of tax aggressiveness are expected to be higher for 
family owners than for managers in non-family firms, the costs are likely higher too. It is 
thus unclear whether family firms will be more or less tax aggressive than non-family 
firms. Accordingly, our hypothesis is non-directional and we address this issue 
empirically:  
Hypothesis: Family-firms exhibit a systematically different level of tax 
aggressiveness compared to non-family firms. 
 
                                                 
13 Joos, Leone, and Zimmerman (2003) report that the average tenure of CEOs in non-family firms is 8 
years, while the average tenure for CEOs who are founding family members is over 17 years and the CEO 
title is often passed from one family member to another. 
14 For example, WalMart was criticized for avoiding taxes in the early 2000s. WalMart subsequently spent 
considerable energy in combating the label of a „poor corporate citizen‟. Toward this end, in WalMart‟s 
2004 letter to the shareholders, Wal-Mart president and CEO Lee Scott explicitly disclosed the federal 
income taxes that WalMart paid in 2004 ($4 billion) to highlight the firm‟s contribution to the treasury 
department. 
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A finding of greater tax aggressiveness in family firms is consistent with family 
owners valuing the tax savings and rent extraction more than the associated costs: price 
discount, IRS penalty, and reputation damage. An opposite finding would suggest that 
family owners‟ concern with these costs outweighs the benefits of tax aggressiveness.  
 
3. Sample and research design 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of 3,865 firm-years from 1,003 firms in the S&P 1500 index 
(S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and S&P Small Cap 600 indices) covering the period 
1996-2000.15 These are the firms that have the required data from Compustat (for 
financial accounting information and tax aggressiveness measures), ExecuComp (for 
executive compensation information), and Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC, for ownership and board information).  
Following prior research (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003; Anderson et al. 2003), 
family firms refer to those in which founders or their family members (by either blood or 
marriage) are key executives, directors, or blockholders. Our collection of ownership and 
the founding family related information involves several steps. First, we start with 
ExecuComp and IRRC databases to identify key insiders (top executives and directors) 
                                                 
15 Our sample ends in 2000 due to prohibitively high data gathering costs related to tracing founding 
families and to finding detailed information on family ownership and control. Note that our family firm 
classification is verified and updated every year. In contrast, some prior studies rely on Business Week 
classifications of S&P 500 in 2003 (BW classification) and extend this classification to other years; this 
approach leads to misclassification for firms that change their status over time.  We compare BW (2003) 
classification with ours for S&P500 firms for 1996-2000, and find that the discrepancies (measured as a 
percentage of the number of firms in the year) are 12.1%, 11.7%, 10.4%, 9.5%, and 7.8% respectively.  We 
re-run our analysis using the BW (2003) classification for S&P 500 firms and find somewhat weaker but 
qualitatively similar results. Thus the potential misclassification does not affect the inferences in our setting 
but it is possible that the inferences are affected in other settings, especially if researchers extend the BW 
classification further back in time.  
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for each company and compile ownership of each insider. Second, for each firm-year, we 
collect information about the founding family: the identity of founders, whether founders 
or their family members are actively involved (e.g., holding key executive positions, 
being directors, or being blockholders), and if they are actively involved, the ownership 
of the founding family. This step is completed through examining Hoover‟s company 
records, company proxy statements or websites (Hoover‟s provides comprehensive 
information about the business, company history, and executives for almost all public 
companies). Third, based on proxy statements, we compile the identities and ownership 
of blockholders other than insiders and founding family members.  
Table 1 reports our sample composition. Of the 3,865 firm-year observations in the 
S&P1500 index, over 46% are family-firm observations, and over 47% of the 1,003 
unique firms that comprise our sample are family firms (Panel A). Panel B of Table 1 
tabulates the industry distribution. There are more family firms than non-family firms in 
Recreational Products, Printing and Publishing, Apparel, Pharmaceutical Products, 
Construction, Electronic Equipment, Transportation, Wholesale and Retail, and 
Restaurants. In contrast, non-family firms outweigh family firms in Steel works, 
Machinery, Petroleum and Natural Gas, Utilities, Hotel and Motel, Banking, and Trading. 
Since prior literature documents cross-industry variation in firms‟ effective tax rate, we 
control for industry effects by including industry dummies in our regression analysis.  
Panel C of Table 1 reports more detailed information about family control and 
ownership. Approximately 64% (1,140 out of 1,790 firm years) of the family-firms are 
managed by family CEOs whereas the rest are managed by professional CEOs. Over 98% 
of the family firms have at least one family member sitting on the board of directors, and 
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approximately 23% have at least three family members on the board. On average, family 
equity ownership is 18.2% within family firms (untabulated), but there is a large variation 
in family ownership. About 70% of family firms have family ownership of 5% or higher 
and about 27% of family firms have family ownership of 25% or higher.  
3.2. Tax aggressiveness measures 
To triangulate our results, we use four measures of tax aggressiveness. Below we 
discuss each measure in turn. For ease of reading we present the detailed definitions of 
these variables in the Appendix. 
The first measure we use is the effective tax rate (ETRi,t): 
ETR i,t = Total Tax Expensei,t (Compustat Data #16) / Pretax Income i,t (#170). 
This measure reflects aggressive tax planning through permanent book-tax differences. 
Examples of such tax planning are investments in tax havens with lower foreign tax rates 
(provided that foreign source earnings are classified as permanently reinvested), 
investments in tax exempt or tax favored assets, and participation in tax shelters that give 
rise to losses for tax purposes but not for book purposes (see Wilson 2008 for a 
discussion of such shelters).  
The second measure we employ is the cash effective tax rate (CETRi,t): 
CETR i,t = Cash Taxes Paidi,t (#317) / Pretax Income i,t (#170). 
This measure reflects both permanent and temporary book-tax differences. By focusing 
on cash taxes paid, this measure avoids the overstatement of current tax expense due to 
the accounting for the income tax benefits of employee stock options during our pre-
SFAS 123R sample period (see Hanlon and Shevlin 2003 for further discussions).16 
                                                 
16 In an additional test, we also explicitly control for the income tax benefits of employee stock options and 
obtain similar inferences.  
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 We also capture tax aggressiveness with two book-tax difference measures: the 
Manzon-Plesko (2002) book-tax difference (MPBTi,t) and a residual book-tax difference 
measure (DDBTi,t) advanced by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). The Desai-Dharmapala 
measure is the residual from a regression of the Manzon-Plesko book-tax difference on 
total accruals. As the book-tax difference can be a result of both earnings management 
and tax planning, the Desai-Dharmapala measure purges, at least partially, the book-tax 
difference caused by earnings management activities.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the means and medians of the tax aggressiveness 
measures, separately for family and non-family firms.17 When using the common 
definition of family firms, the statistics indicate that family firms exhibit significantly 
lower tax aggressiveness than non-family firms: the effective tax rate measures are higher 
and the book-tax difference measures are lower for family firms than for non-family 
firms. The differences in means and medians are significantly different from zero, with 
the exception of the difference in the mean cash effective tax rate. In the same panel, we 
also report the statistics using an alternative family firm classification: firms with at least 
5% family ownership. The inferences based on ETR measures are similar, but the 
difference in book-tax difference measures is insignificant.  
Table 2, Panel B reports the correlations between these four measures. All 
correlations are significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level: the effective tax rate 
measures are positively correlated with each other, and are negatively correlated with the 
book-tax difference measures. Accordingly, we extract a common factor from these four 
                                                 
17 The numbers are comparable to those reported in prior research (e.g., Manzon and Plesko 2002; Dyreng 
et al. 2008). Note that some prior studies, such as Graham and Tucker (2006), only include federal tax and 
thus report a much lower effective tax rate. In contrast, we include federal, foreign, and state taxes in the 
calculation of effective tax rate measures. We obtain the same inferences when we analyze an estimate of 
federal effective tax rate. 
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measures and use it in an additional test. However, the relatively low magnitudes of the 
correlation coefficients indicate that the four measures capture different aspects of tax 
aggressiveness and/or contain measurement errors. Using different measures of tax 
aggressiveness with similar results helps triangulate and strengthen our inferences.  
3.3. Research Design 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression: 
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 (1) 
where: 
TaxAggi,t = Tax aggressiveness measure as discussed above; 
FAMILYi,t = Measured as 1) an indicator variable coded as 1 for family firms, zero otherwise; 
2) founding family equity ownership; or 3) an indicator variable coded as 1 if 
founding family ownership is t 5%; 
ROAi,t = Return on assets for firm i, year t, measured as operating income (#170-#192) 
scaled by lagged assets (#6); 
LEVi,t = Leverage for firm i, year t, measured long-term debt (#9) scaled by lagged assets 
(#6); 
NOLi,t = Indicator variable coded as 1 if loss carry forward (#52) is positive as of the 
beginning of the year t; 
'NOLi,t = Change in loss carry forward (#52) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (#6); 
FIi,t = Foreign income (#273) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (#6); 
PPEi,t = PPE (#8) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (#6); 
INTANGi,t = Intangible assets (#33) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (#6); 
EQINCi,t = Equity income in earnings (#55) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (#6); 
SIZEi,t-1 = Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (#199u#25) for firm i, at the 
beginning of year t; 
MBi,t-1 = Market to book ratio for firm i, at the beginning of year t, measured as market 
value of equity (#199u#25), scaled by book value of equity (#60); 
BTDi,t-1= Book-tax difference, for firm i, year t-1 (see the Appendix for detailed definition). 
 
For ease of reading, we also present these variable definitions in the Appendix.  
If family firms are more tax aggressive than non-family firms, we expect a negative 
coefficient on the FAMILY variable, E1, when using effective tax rates to capture tax 
aggressiveness, and a positive coefficient E1 when using book-tax differences to capture 
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tax aggressiveness. We expect opposite signs if family firms are less tax aggressive. To 
mitigate statistical concerns arising from the potential time-series dependence in the data, 
we conduct a robustness check by taking the averages of our tax aggressiveness measures 
and our independent variables over the five year sampling period so that each firm only 
appears once in our analysis.  We discuss the analyses and results of this approach in 
Section 6.5. As an additional robustness check, we also estimate regression (1) by year 
and use the Fama and MacBeth design to test the significance level of the average 
coefficients. We find the results are essentially the same as those reported below, and for 
the sake of brevity, we do not tabulate these results.  
We control for firm characteristics documented in prior literature (e.g., Manzon and 
Plesko 2002; Mills 1998; Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2008) that are 
correlated with our tax aggressive measures so as to ensure that our results are not driven 
by fundamental differences between family and non-family firms. The first set of control 
variables ( ROA, LEV, NOL, 'NOL, and FI ) captures firms‟ profitability, leverage and 
foreign operations.  For example, prior research (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003) finds 
that family firms have better operating performance than non-family firms (and likely 
less loss carry forward). More profitable firms and firms with less loss carry forward tend 
to have higher effective tax rates. Therefore family firms will appear to be less tax 
aggressive if we do not control for profitability and loss carry forward. Similar logic 
applies to leverage and foreign operations.  
The second set of control variables (PPE, INTANG, EQINC) captures differences 
in book and tax reporting that can affect our tax aggressiveness measures. Capital 
intensive firms are affected more by the different treatments of depreciation expense for 
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tax and financial reporting purposes, thus we include PPE. We include intangible assets 
(INTANG) and equity in earnings (EQINC) in our regressions to control for the 
differential book and tax treatments of intangible assets and consolidated earnings 
accounted for using the equity method. Similar to the first group of variables, these 
controls are intended to capture systematic differences between family and non-family 
firms that are correlated with our tax measures. 
Lastly, we control for firm size and growth (proxied by MB) as growing firms may 
make more investments in tax-favored assets that generate timing differences in the 
recognition of expenses. For regressions with book-tax differences as the dependent 
variable, we follow prior studies (e.g., Manzon and Plesko 2002) and include lagged 
book-tax differences to control for book-tax differences that persist through time.18 Note 
that with the exception of SIZE, MB, and BTD, all other control variables are measured 
contemporaneously with the dependent variables, as these factors are expected to be 
correlated with tax aggressiveness contemporaneously. In addition, for all regressions we 
include dummies to control for year and industry fixed effects.19 
Note that controlling for firm characteristics that are related to standard methods of 
tax planning (foreign operations, intangible assets, loss carry forward, etc.) is not 
“throwing the baby out with the bath water.”  Adding those variables simply controls for 
                                                 
18 To maintain the symmetry between ETR regressions and book-tax difference regressions, in sensitivity 
tests we either exclude lagged book-tax differences for regressions explaining book-tax differences, or 
include lagged ETR measures for regressions explaining ETR measures. Our inferences on the family test 
variables are unchanged. 
19 King and Peng (2008) examine the history of firms included in the S&P500 in 1993 and document that 
family firms tend to lose control earlier in more cyclical industries and industries with high capital 
intensity. Their result is consistent with our evidence in Table 1, Panel B. Family firms cluster in less 
capital intensive and unregulated industries probably because family firms are less likely to use outside 
financing due to risk aversion or fear of losing control and families prefer less regulatory interference. 
Apart from controlling for industry fixed effects, we re-run our analysis using industry-clustered t-statistics 
and obtain similar results. We also exclude all the regulated industries from our sample and obtain similar 
results. 
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the average tax effects associated with those variables (for instance, firms with more 
foreign income on average have lower ETRs). Take foreign operations as an example. 
Firms with similar foreign operations are not equally tax aggressive.  Among firms with 
foreign operations, one firm can locate in low foreign tax jurisdictions (such as Microsoft 
in Ireland) to take advantage of the low tax rates, whereas another firm locates in 
countries to be close to major customers or suppliers and these countries might have high 
tax rates.  That is, more tax aggressive firms will place a higher priority on taxes in their 
foreign location decisions.  Further, more tax aggressive firms with foreign operations 
will be more aggressive in their transfer pricing to shift income to lower tax rate 
jurisdictions. Therefore, controlling for the level of foreign operations purges out the 
average ETR effect but leaves much room for us to capture firms‟ tax planning activities 
within the scope of foreign operations. Similar arguments apply to other control 
variables. Thus the estimated coefficient on the family firm measures captures variation 
in family firms‟ tax aggressiveness relative to non-family firms after controlling for the 
average level of the tax measures for firms with foreign operations, with intangibles, etc., 
as well as variation in tax aggressiveness due to other means.20  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and 
control variables, separately for family firms and non-family firms. Consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003), we find that family firms exhibit better 
operating performance (ROA) and higher market-to-book ratios. Family firms are less 
                                                 
20 Some examples of other tax planning activities include: state tax planning, tax sheltering, use of flow 
through entities to achieve tax savings, use of off-balance sheet financing vehicles that give rise to tax 
deductions but no debt or interest on the financial statements (Mills and Newberry 2005), structuring inter-
corporate investments to get dividend treatment (taking advantage of the corporate dividends received 
deduction, rather than corporate capital gains tax treatment, since corporate capital gains are taxed at the 
same rate as ordinary corporate income), and aggressively claiming the R&D tax credit – by being overly 
inclusive in what is included in R&D expenditures. 
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leveraged, have lower capital intensity (PPE), and are smaller than non-family firms, 
though they are not significantly different from non-family firms in the existence of net 
operating loss (NOL) or intangible assets.  
Panel B of Table 3 presents the correlations among the control variables. Consistent 
with Panel A, the family firm indicator is positively correlated with ROA and MB, and 
negatively correlated with LEV, PPE, and SIZE. Most of the correlations among control 
variables are small, and thus multicollinearity is not an issue. 
 
4. Primary empirical analyses 
Table 4 presents the regression analysis of our hypothesis. We conduct the analyses 
using three alternative proxies to capture founding family presence: a family firm 
indicator (Panel A), a continuous family equity ownership variable (Panel B), and an 
alternative family firm indicator coded as one if founding family ownership is equal to or 
greater than 5%, i.e., family blockhoder indicator (Panel C). Panel A shows that family 
firms are significantly less tax aggressive than non-family firms based on all four 
measures of tax aggressiveness. The results are also economically significant. For 
example, the difference in effective tax rate between family and non-family firms is 
0.5%, which is about one-tenth of our sample inter-quartile range of 5.3%. In an 
untabulated test, we find that the mean pre-tax income is $561 million in our sample. 
Thus, a reduction in effective tax rate of 0.5% roughly translates into a tax saving of $2.8 
million for an average firm. The difference in MPBT is 0.6% of assets, which is more 
than one-tenth of our sample inter-quartile range of 5.3%.  
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The results using family equity ownership in place of a family indicator variable are 
similar, though family ownership has insignificant coefficients when the book-tax 
difference measures are used as the dependent variables (Panel B).21 Note that using a 
continuous ownership variable implies a linear relation between tax aggressiveness and 
family equity ownership. If tax aggressiveness does not change linearly with family 
ownership, using family ownership will bias against finding results.  
In Panel C, we use the family blockholder indicator to capture family presence. This 
definition, while putting some restriction on the level of family ownership, does not 
assume a linear relation between family ownership and tax aggressiveness. Under this 
definition, 32.3% of the firm-years are classified as family firms. These results show a 
significant difference between family and non-family firms in both the tax rates and the 
book-tax differences, though the result using ETR is marginally significant.  
To sum up, the above analysis indicates that family firms exhibit a lower level of 
tax aggressiveness. This result suggests that the larger agency conflict between family 
owners and non-family shareholders dominate family owners‟ decision about tax 
aggressiveness: family firms engage in fewer tax planning transactions and forgo tax 
benefits in order to avoid the associated costs, including the potential price discount by 
other shareholders.  This concern about price discount is reinforced by family owners‟ 
greater concern about the potential penalty imposed by the IRS and the subsequent 
reputation damage.  Family owners are more concerned with these costs due to the nature 
                                                 
21 Recall that the average difference in equity ownership between family and non-family firms is 
approximately 20%; this, coupled with the coefficient of 0.02 on the family ownership dummy (when using 
ETR as the dependent variable), indicate that the difference in ETR is about 0.04% between family and 
non-family firms. This magnitude is close to the coefficient of 0.05% documented in Panel A on the family 
firm indicator.  
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of their holdings – large, under-diversified, and long investment horizon – as well as their 
concerns with family reputation.  
 
5. Corroborating analyses 
If concerns about price discount arising from a larger agency conflict between 
family owners and other shareholders dominate family firms‟ decision on tax 
aggressiveness, then we should expect to see predictable differences when such concerns 
are mitigated or heightened.  In this section we offer evidence to corroborate the above 
inference by identifying two situations where such predictable differences likely exist: 
when family firms have effective outside monitoring and when they seek external 
financing. 
Since effective outside monitoring can mitigate managerial rent extraction, the 
concern with family members seeking rents through tax aggressive activities and hence 
the price discount imposed by other shareholders will be mitigated for such firms. 
Accordingly, family firms with effective outside monitoring will be more tax aggressive 
than otherwise.  In contrast, family firms planning to raise external capital are arguably 
more concerned about investors‟ perception of family entrenchment and the 
corresponding price discount because the proceeds from debt or equity offerings can be 
negatively affected. It follows that family firms expecting to raise capital are less likely to 
engage in opaque transactions that can be used for both tax aggressiveness and rent 
extraction purposes. Thus, we expect to find even lower tax aggressiveness for family 
firms in need of external financing. 
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5.1. The effect of outside monitoring 
To examine the impact of external monitoring, we introduce an indicator variable, 
EXTMON, coded as one for firms with long-term institutional holdings (Gaspar et al. 
2005), and its interaction with the family-firm indicator (FAMILY) to regression (1). As 
in Gaspar et al. (2005), we calculate average institutional ownership turnover for a given 
firm-year and classify firms with institutional ownership turnover measure in the bottom 
quartile of the sample distribution as firms with long-term institutional investors. If the 
above prediction holds, we expect to observe a negative (positive) coefficient on the 
interaction term FAMILY u EXTMON in regressions using effective tax rates (book-tax 
differences) as dependent variables.  
Table 5, Panel A presents the regression results. For parsimony we do not tabulate 
the results on the control variables. The results are largely consistent with our prediction: 
relative to other family firms, family firms with long-term institutional investors are more 
tax aggressive, as is evident from the negative (positive) coefficients on the interaction 
variable FAMILY u EXTMON using ETR (MPBT and DDBT) as dependent variables. 
In contrast, the coefficient on EXTMON is largely insignificant, indicating that having 
long-term institutional investors does not affect non-family firms‟ tax aggressiveness. 
Untabulated F-tests indicate that family firms with long-term institutional investors are 
not less tax aggressive than non-family firms. 
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5.2. The effect of external financing 
We proxy for a firm‟s expectation of external financing using an indicator variable, 
EXTFIN, coded as one if the firm issues debt or equity per SDC in the next year.22 We 
add this external financing indicator, as well as its interaction with the family firm 
indicator variable, FAMILY u EXTFIN, to equation (1). Table 5, Panel B presents the 
regression results. With the exception of the cash effective tax rate, the results are 
consistent with our conjecture: relative to other family firms, family firms expecting to 
raise capital exhibit a higher effective tax rate and lower book-tax differences. In 
contrast, there is evidence that non-family firms are even more tax aggressive when they 
are in need of external financing: the coefficient on EXTFIN for non-family firms is 
negative (positive) in the regressions with effective tax rates (book-tax differences) as 
dependent variables.  
To sum up, the two additional tests on external monitoring and external financing 
strengthen the inference that family firms‟ concern with other investors‟ perception of 
family entrenchment, together with the complementarity of tax aggressiveness activities 
and rent seeking activities, reduces these firms‟ tax aggressiveness.  This reinforces the 
role of the agency conflict between family owners and other shareholders in family firms‟ 
tax planning decisions. 
 
6. Additional analyses 
                                                 
22 Due to the low frequency of equity financing, it is not fruitful to examine the potentially different impact 
of debt financing and equity financing.  
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6.1. The effect of CEO type  
In this section, we explore whether the type of CEOs hired by family firms affect 
their tax aggressiveness. As described above, while some family firms have family 
members as the CEOs, others hire professional CEOs. Prior research (e.g., Anderson and 
Reeb 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006) finds that having a family-member CEO can 
further increase family control. Family control can increase the opportunities for rent 
extraction, but at the same time, it can also increase the associated cost – the price 
discount. Since these two effects have opposite impacts on the extent of tax 
aggressiveness, we have no ex ante prediction on which type of family firms are more tax 
aggressive. Instead, we examine whether the overall results we document above equally 
applies to family firms with different types of CEOs.  
For this purpose, we replace the family firm variable in equation (1) with three 
indicator variables, coded as one for professional CEO family firms (FAM_PCEO), 
founder CEO firms (FOUNDER_CEO) and descendant CEO firms (DESC_CEO), 
respectively. Within our family firm sample, 789 firm-years are managed by founder 
CEOs, 353 firm-years are managed by descendant CEOs, and the rest (648 firm-years) 
are managed by non-family professional CEOs. Panel A of Table 6 reports regression 
results. We find that overall, relative to non-family firms, both professional CEO family 
firms and founder CEO firms exhibit less tax aggressiveness but descendant CEO firms 
in general do not. An interpretation of this result is that descendant CEOs are not as 
concerned with investors‟ perception of family entrenchment and/or the 
monetary/reputation damage brought by an IRS audit as the other two types of CEOs in 
family firms.  
 28 
6.2. The effect of outside blockholder and CEO equity ownership  
In this section, we examine whether family owners have a differential impact on tax 
aggressiveness than outside blockholders and CEO ownership. While both family owners 
and other blockholders have high equity ownership, they differ in two important aspects: 
family owners have less-diversified holdings and longer investment horizon, and they 
also have greater influence over firm management as family owners tend to act as CEOs 
and generally sit on the board of directors. The greater influence gives family owners the 
power to affect corporate decisions as well as the opportunities to extract rents. In Panel 
B of Table 6, we augment equation (1) with an indicator variable for the existence of 
outside blockholders. The results show that the coefficient on the blockholder indicator is 
significant in only one regression, while the coefficient on our family firm proxy remains 
significant in all four regressions. Thus, unlike family owners, outside blockholders do 
not seem to have a reliable impact on firms‟ tax aggressiveness. 
In Panel C of Table 6, we examine whether family owners‟ impact on tax 
aggressiveness is affected by CEO equity ownership. We add CEO equity ownership into 
equation (1). The coefficients on our family firm indicator continue to be significant in all 
four regressions, while none of the coefficients on CEO equity ownership is significant, 
suggesting that our inference is robust to controlling for CEO equity ownership and that 
CEO ownership has little impact when the presence of founding family is controlled for.  
We use the family-firm indicator in this specification to be consistent with other 
analyses. When we replace the family-firm indicator with family ownership, we find that 
the results on family ownership are similar to those reported in Table 4, Panel B. We also 
find that CEO ownership continues to have insignificant coefficients in the ETR and cash 
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ETR regressions, but has significantly negative coefficients in the book-tax difference 
regressions. The latter result suggests that firms are less tax aggressive when CEO 
ownership is higher, consistent with Desai and Dharmapala‟s (2006) result that the level 
of tax aggressiveness is negatively associated with CEO incentive compensations in firms 
with weak corporate governance. 
6.3. Differences in firm sophistication as an alternative explanation 
In this section, we report the results of our investigation of an alternative 
explanation for family firms‟ lower tax aggressiveness: family firms are less tax 
sophisticated than non-family firms, because they are on average younger and firms learn 
by experience in managing businesses. While firm size can capture sophistication to 
some extent, we nevertheless use an additional proxy for firms‟ sophistication: firm age. 
Firm age, measured as the number of years since the year of firm founding, is available 
for 3,549 firm-years. On average, family firms are younger than non-family firms by 22 
years. After adding the log of firm age to equation (1), we obtain quantitatively similar 
results on the family firm indicator. The coefficient on firm age is significantly positive 
in the ETR, CETR, and MPBT regressions, and insignificant in the DDBT regression, 
yielding mixed evidence on the effect of firm age on tax aggressiveness.  
6.4. Tax sheltering analysis 
Graham and Tucker (2006) identify a sample of 43 publicly traded companies as tax 
shelter users (see their Table 1). Since tax sheltering is a more „precise‟ measure of tax 
aggressiveness, an analysis of whether family firms are more or less likely to be involved 
in the identified tax sheltering cases can complement our main empirical analysis. Of the 
43 cases identified in Graham and Tucker (2006), we are able to match 42 firms to our 
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sample. Of these, 28 are non-family firms and 14 (one-third) are family firms. The 
percentage of family firms involved with tax shelters (33%) is lower than the percentage 
of family firms in our sample (46%). Based on Fisher‟s exact test, the two-sided p-value 
of the difference is 0.072. Thus, this small sample analysis provides corroborating results 
to our large sample evidence that family firms are less tax aggressive than non-family 
firms.23 
6.5. Private banks vs. public family banks and public non-family banks 
Prior research, studying selected industries such as banks and insurers, documents 
that private firms tend to be more tax aggressive than public firms (e.g., Cloyd et al. 
1996; Beatty and Harris 1999; Mills and Newberry 2001; Hanlon et al. 2005), yet we find 
that family firms are less tax aggressive than non-family firms.  This difference is 
intriguing since both private firms and family firms are characterized by concentrated 
ownership.  We conjecture that private firms and public family firms likely face different 
agency and reputational issues: private firms are closely monitored, do not rely on outside 
shareholders for funding and are likely less concerned with the perceptions of diffuse 
investors.  To reconcile our findings with prior research, we compare the ETRs of three 
sets of firms: private banks, public non-family banks, and public family banks (results not 
tabulated).  We focus on banks because financial data for private firms in other industries 
are not readily available.  We obtain data on private banks from the Bank Regulatory 
database on WRDS.  Because this database does not provide cash flow data necessary to 
                                                 
23 If tax sheltering firms tend to be large firms, then the tax sheltering evidence can be driven by differences 
in firm size between the sample of tax sheltering firms and our large sample, since family firms tend to be 
smaller than non-family firms. To address this concern, we examine the size composition of the tax 
sheltering sample and find that it is similar to our sample. Therefore, it is unlikely that the evidence is 
driven by differences in firm size. 
 31 
calculate cash ETR and because the data required to calculate book-tax difference 
measures (MPBT and DDBT) are unavailable for most banks, we focus on ETR.   
In the univariate analysis, we find that the ETR of public family banks is higher 
than ETR of public non-family banks, which is in turn higher than ETR of private banks.  
All the differences in means and medians are significant at the 5% level, except for the 
mean difference between public family and public non-family banks.  Regression 
analysis yields consistent results: ETR of public family banks > ETR of public non-
family banks > ETR of private banks.  The difference between public family banks and 
private banks is significant at the 0.01 level. The differences between public family banks 
and public non-family banks, and the difference between public non-family banks and 
private banks are marginally significant (t-statistics are1.56 and 1.65, respectively). 
The above analysis provides evidence consistent with both prior research that finds 
that private firms are more tax aggressive than public firms, and with our main finding 
that family firms are less tax aggressive than non-family firms.  The evidence supports 
our conjecture that different agency problems and reputation concerns in private firms 
affect their tax planning strategies. 
 
6.6. Sensitivity checks 
One common factor as a measure of tax aggressiveness 
Since the four tax aggressiveness measures used above are correlated with each 
other and are intended to capture one common construct, we conduct a factor analysis to 
extract one common factor from these four measures.24 This common factor is negatively 
                                                 
24 We conduct a Principal Components factor analysis of the four tax aggressiveness variables. The first 
factor has an eigenvalue of 1.91 and the other three factors have eigenvalues of less than 0.3. Thus we only 
retain the first factor. The correlation coefficients between this common factor and the four variables are 
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correlated with the effective tax rate measures and positively correlated with book-tax 
differences; thus a higher factor indicates greater tax aggressiveness. Table 7 reports the 
results from regressing this common factor on family firm indicator and control variables. 
The coefficient on our family firm indicator is significantly negative. This result is 
consistent with our results using the four individual tax aggressiveness measures: family 
firms are less tax aggressive than non-family firms. 
Use firm-level measures to capture tax aggressiveness 
One statistical concern arises from the potential serial dependence in our data: 
family firms‟ tax activities and family firm classification might remain relatively stable 
over time.  Thus, we also conduct the analysis at the firm level using the averages of our 
empirical measures over the 5-year sampling period, with average tax rates measured as 
aggregate tax expense or aggregate cash taxes divided by aggregate pre-tax income over 
the period. The average Manzon-Plesko book-tax difference measure is calculated 
similarly by taking the averages over five years first before scaling by the average lagged 
assets.  Because the Desai-Dharmapala book-tax difference measure is a residual, we 
directly take the five year averages of the residuals as long as a firm has three non-
missing values. We regress the five-year averages of the tax aggressiveness measures on 
the five-year averages of the control variables, omitting the year dummies. For control 
variables that are ratios, we compute the averages of the numerators and denominators 
before computing the ratios.  
Table 8 presents the regression results. We conduct the analyses using the family 
firm indicator. We find that family firms, relative to non-family firms, exhibit 
                                                                                                                                                 
0.88 (ETR), 0.83 (cash ETR), -0.44 (MP book-tax difference), and -0.51 (DD book-tax difference), 
respectively. 
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significantly higher effective tax rates and smaller book-tax differences; the only 
exception is when we use cash effective tax rate to capture tax aggressiveness. The 
difference is also economically significant: for example, after controlling for other factors 
that might affect tax aggressiveness, the difference of 1.1% between family and non-
family firms‟ ETR is about one-fifth of our sample inter-quartile range. 
S&P500 versus S&P1000 firms 
We split our sample into two groups, S&P 500 firms and S&P 1000 (S&P400 and 
S&P600) firms, and re-estimate equation (1) on these two sub-samples. While the results 
are slightly stronger for S&P 1000 firms than for S&P 500 firms, the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
 
7. Conclusion  
We examine the tax aggressiveness of family firms, relative to their non-family 
counterparts. We use multiple measures (two tax rate measures and two book-tax 
difference measures, and a common factor extracted from these four measures) to capture 
tax aggressiveness and different proxies for founding family presence in order to 
triangulate our results. Contrary to the notion that family firms would exhibit a higher 
level of tax aggressiveness as family owners will benefit more from tax savings, we 
document that family firms exhibit lower tax aggressiveness. This result highlights the 
importance of non-tax costs, including those that can arise from agency conflicts.  Our 
results are consistent with family owners being more concerned with the non-tax costs of 
potential price discounts from non-family shareholders, the potential penalty imposed by 
the IRS, and the potential damage on family reputation. 
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This finding reinforces Desai and Dharmapala‟s (2006) argument that tax 
aggressiveness activities are often bundled with rent extraction. Since investors will price 
protect themselves if tax aggressiveness activities are used to mask rent extraction, family 
owners are willing to forgo the benefits of saved taxes in order to avoid the price 
discounts associated with investors‟ perception of family entrenchment. In this aspect, 
our results are consistent with prior studies‟ findings that overall, family entrenchment is 
not a serious concern in U.S. family firms, unlike in family firms in other countries 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003; Wang 2006; Ali et al. 2007). However, this does not imply 
that investors can assume away the possibility of family entrenchment. It is possible that 
the lower extent of family entrenchment is an outcome of minority shareholders‟ threat of 
price discount in anticipation of family entrenchment.    
Our results highlight the importance of the unique agency conflict between family 
owners and other shareholders in determining family firms‟ tax reporting. We offer 
corroborating evidence by focusing on scenarios where family owners‟ concern with 
investors‟ perception of family entrenchment is predictably weaker or stronger. We find 
that, relative to other family firms, family firms with long-term institutional investors as 
effective outside monitors are more tax aggressive, presumably because these 
institutional investors can reduce the rent extraction of family owners. In contrast, family 
firms expecting to raise external capital are arguably more concerned with the negative 
perception of rent extraction. We find these firms to be even less tax aggressive.  
In addition, our analysis of the Graham-Tucker (2006) tax sheltering firms shows 
that family firms are less likely to use tax shelters. We also find that our results are 
mainly attributed to family firms run by founders or non-family professional CEOs, and 
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the results hold after controlling for outside blockholding, CEO equity ownership, and 
firm sophistication measured by firm age.  
Our paper contributes toward a better understanding of the impact of ownership 
structure on firms‟ tax reporting practices. We also extend the family firm literature by 
documenting family firms‟ differential tax reporting behavior. Our results, that family 
firms are less tax aggressive, might be surprising to some given prior studies‟ result that 
private firms are more tax aggressive than public firms. The „surprising‟ result highlights 
the importance of studying tax aggressiveness in an agency setting.  While family firms 
are similar to private firms in the ownership concentration of selected individual (usually 
the firm founders), unlike private firms, family firms face large-small shareholder 
conflict and the corresponding cost – price discount.  Our additional analysis comparing 
private banks to public family banks provides corroborating evidence: we find that 
private banks are more tax aggressive than public non-family banks, which are in turn 
more tax aggressive than public family banks.  Our results show that the agency conflict 
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Appendix: Variable Measurement 
 
Part I: Measurement of Tax Aggressiveness 
1. Effective tax rate (ETR): 
 ETR i,t = Total Tax Expensei,t / Pretax Income i,t = Compustat item #16/#170 
ETR is set as missing when the denominator is zero or negative. We truncate ETR to 
the range [0, 1]. 
 
2. Cash effective tax rate (CETR):  
 CETR i,t = Cash Taxes Paid i,t / Pretax Income i,t = #317/#170 
CETR is set to missing when the denominator is zero or negative. We truncate CETR 
to the range [0, 1]. 
 
3. Manzon-Plesko (2002) book-tax difference (MPBT): (US domestic financial income 
– US domestic taxable income – Income Taxes (State) –Income Taxes (Other) – 
Equity in Earnings)/lagged assets =(#272- #63/Statutory tax rate - #173 - #211 - #55) 
/#6t-1. 
 
We remove observations with total assets less than $1 million (to mitigate small 
deflator problem) and observations with negative taxable income (#63<0). 
 
4. Desai-Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax difference (DDBT): μi + εi,t from the 
following firm fixed-effect regression: 
BTi,t = β1TAi,t + μi + εi,t 
where BT is the Manzon-Plesko book-tax difference, TA is total accruals measured 
using the cash flow method per Hribar and Collins (2002). Both variables are scaled 
by lagged total assets and are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels for regression 
purposes. μi is the average value of the residual for firm i over the sample period, and 
εi,t is the deviation of the residual in year t from firm i‟s average residual. 
 
We remove observations with total assets less than $1 million (to mitigate small 
deflator problem) and observations with negative taxable income (#63<0).  
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Part II: Definition of Family Firm Proxies and Control Variables 
,i tFAMILY = Measured as 1) an indicator variable coded as 1 for family firms, zero otherwise; 
2) founding family % equity ownership; or 3) an indicator variable coded as 1 if 
founding family ownership is t 5%; 
 
,i tROA = Return on assets for firm i, year t, measured as operating income (#170-#192) 
scaled by lagged assets (#6); 
 
,i tLEV = Leverage for firm i, year t, measured long-term debt (#9) scaled by lagged assets 
(#6); 
 
,i tNOL = Indicator variable coded as 1 if loss carry forward (#52) is positive as of the 
beginning of the year t; 
 
,i tNOL' = Change in loss carry forward (#52) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets 
(#6); 
 
,i tFI = Foreign income (#273) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets; 
 
,i tPPE = PPE (#8) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets; 
 
,i tINTANG = Intangible assets (#33) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets; 
 
,i tEQINC = Equity income in earnings (#55) for firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets; 
 
, 1i tSIZE  = Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (#199u#25) for firm i, at the 
beginning of year t; 
 
, 1i tMB  = Market to book ratio for firm i, at the beginning of year t, measured as market 
value of equity (#199u#25), scaled by book value of equity (#60); 
  






This table reports the composition of our sample, which consists of 3,865 firm-years from 1,003 
firms in the S&P 1500 index (S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices) 
covering the period 1996-2000. 
 
Panel A Sample composition 
 








Full sample 3865 100%  1003 100% 
      
Composition by S&P index*      
S&P 500 Large Cap 1558 40.7%  384 30.1% 
S&P 400 Mid Cap 1057 27.6%  362 28.4% 
S&P 600 Small Cap 1213 31.7%  528 41.4% 
 
Composition by firm type 
     
 
Family firm** 1790 46.3%  476 47.5% 
Non-family firm 2075 53.7%  527 52.5% 
 
*A small number of observations (included in the analyses) have missing index classification 
value in Compustat. 
** Family firms refer to firms where members of the founding family, either by blood or 
marriage, continue to hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders of 
the company.   
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B Industry distribution of sample firm-years, by firm type 
 
Industry 
(per Fama and French 1997) 
Non-family 
firms frequency  
Family firms 
frequency  
% of family 
firms 
Food products 41  42  51% 
Recreational products 5  24  83% 
Printing and publishing 20  49  71% 
Consumer goods 48  43  47% 
Apparel 27  45  63% 
Healthcare 25  25  50% 
Medical equipment 37  39  51% 
Pharmaceutical products 59  81  58% 
Chemicals 74  54  42% 
Rubber and plastic products 6  20  77% 
Construction materials 36  40  53% 
Construction 29  39  57% 
Steel works, etc. 56  22  28% 
Machinery 103  54  34% 
Electrical equipment 27  35  56% 
Automobile and trucks 47  41  47% 
Petroleum and gas 98  52  35% 
Utilities 277  12  4% 
Telecommunications 21  27  56% 
Business services 140  153  52% 
Computers 60  58  49% 
Electronic equipment 81  148  65% 
Measuring and control equipment 45  29  39% 
Business supplies 70  32  31% 
Transportation 52  71  58% 
Wholesale 42  73  63% 
Retail 95  162  63% 
Restaurants, hotel, motel 29  61  68% 
Banking 158  51  24% 
Insurance 100  83  45% 
Trading 27  0  0% 
Other * 140  125  47% 
 
* Other industries include those industries that have less than 20 observations: Agriculture, 
Aircraft, Alcoholic beverages, Candy and soda, Defense, Entertainment, Fabricated products, 
Miscellaneous, Nonmetallic mining, Personal services, Precious metals, Real estate, Shipbuilding 
and railroad equipment, Shipping containers, Textiles, and Tobacco products. 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel C Control and ownership characteristics of family firms (N=1,790) 
 
 





Percentage of family firms in which a founding family member (a founder or a 
descendant) is the CEO 
63.8% 
 
Representation of family members on the board of directors 
Percentage of families with at least one member on the board of directors 98.6% 
Percentage of families with at least two members on the board of directors 55.2% 
Percentage of families with at least three members on the board of directors 23.4% 
 
Family ownership 
Percentage of families with at least 5% ownership 69.8% 




Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics of Tax Aggressiveness Measures 
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics of tax aggressiveness measures separately for family and non-
family firms 
 
The last two columns report the two-sided p-value for the difference between family and non-
family firms in means and medians, respectively. T-tests (Wilcoxon rank tests) are used to test the 
difference in means (medians). See the Appendix for variable definitions.  
 
 
 Family firms  Non-family firms  p-values of the 
difference 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Mean Median 
 
Family firms refer to firms where founding family members continue to hold positions in top 
management, are on the board, or are blockholders 
 
ETR  1,671 0.367 0.370  1,959 0.355 0.360  0001 0.001 
Cash ETR  1,671 0.308 0.309  1,959 0.307 0.298  0.819 0.039 
MP book-tax difference 1,512 0.015 0.017  1,618 0.023 0.019  0.005 0.010 
DD book-tax difference 1,512 0.010 0.012  1,612 0.018 0.014  0.003 0.081 
 
Family firms refer to firms with family equity ownershipt5% 
 
ETR  1,184 0.368 0.371  2,446 0.357 0.361  0.003 0.001 
Cash ETR  1,184 0.316 0.316  2,446 0.303 0.296  0.004 0.001 
MP book-tax difference 1,050 0.018 0.018  2,080 0.020 0.018  0.600 0.161 
DD book-tax difference 1,050 0.012 0.012  2,074 0.016 0.014  0.154 0.148 
 
 
Panel B Pearson correlation matrix of tax aggressiveness measures (two-sided p-values in 
parentheses).  
  
 ETR Cash ETR MP book-tax difference 
Cash ETR 0.387   
 (0.001)   
MP book-tax difference -0.361 -0.400  
 (0.001) (0.001)  
DD book-tax difference -0.242 -0.359 0.876 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics on Firms Characteristics and Control Variables 
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics  
The last two columns report the two-sided p-value for the difference between family and non-
family firms in means and medians, respectively. T-tests (Wilcoxon rank tests) are used to test the 
difference in means (medians).  See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
  Family firms 
(N=1,790) 
 Non-family firms 
(N=2,075) 
 p-values of the 
difference in 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
 
Tax planning opportunities and differences in book-tax reporting 
ROA  0.134 0.122  0.105 0.087  0.001 0.001 
Leverage  0.201 0.148  0.240 0.216  0.001 0.001 
NOL dummy  0.193 0.000  0.189 0.000  0.705 0.730 
Change in NOL  0.005 0.000  0.003 0.000  0.098 0.224 
Foreign Income  0.016 0.000  0.017 0.000  0.303 0.009 
PPE  0.344 0.284  0.378 0.297  0.001 0.015 
Intangible assets  0.117 0.026  0.114 0.022  0.710 0.911 
Equity income  0.00060 0.000  0.00130 0.000  0.004 0.001 
 
Firm size and growth 
MV ($Mil.)  6,998 1,285  11,297 2,592  0.001 0.001 
Total assets ($Mil.)  4,987 1,049  16,853 2,754  0.001 0.001 
Market to book ratio  4.389 2.664  3.628 2.445  0.062 0.005 
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B Pearson correlation matrix (two-sided p-values in parentheses) 
 
 FAMILY ROA LEV NOL 'NOL FI PPE INTANG EQINC SIZE 
           
ROA 0.118          
 (0.001)          
LEV -0.102 -0.200         
 (0.001) (0.001)         
NOL 0.006 -0.075 0.049        
 (0.730) (0.001) (0.002)        
'NOL -0.005 -0.137 0.071 0.265       
 (0.755) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)       
FI -0.022 0.287 -0.099 0.125 -0.013      
 (0.181) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.410)      
PPE -0.057 -0.002 0.413 -0.022 0.020 -0.039     
 (0.000) (0.880) (0.001) (0.171) (0.220) (0.016)     
INTANG 0.008 0.031 0.316 0.069 0.064 0.017 -0.095    
 (0.620) (0.057) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.297) (0.001)    
EQINC -0.050 0.044 0.072 -0.008 -0.033 0.017 0.092 0.076   
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.613) (0.043) (0.283) (0.001) (0.001)   
SIZE -0.200 0.094 -0.036 0.052 -0.005 0.234 -0.046 0.051 0.064  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.001) (0.733) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)  
MB 0.029 0.441 -0.089 0.066 0.058 0.286 -0.100 0.071 0.028 0.389 




Firm-year Level Analysis of Family Firms’ Tax Aggressiveness 
Model:  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 , 1 11 , 1 12 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
TaxAgg FAMILY ROA LEV NOL NOL FI PPE INTANG
EQINC SIZE MB BTD Year Dummies Industry Dummies
D E E E E E E E E
E E E E H  
      '   
      
  
See the Appendix for the definition of variables. For each variable, the t-statistic is reported in the 
parenthesis. Year and industry dummies are included in each specification and for the sake of 
brevity, the results for these dummies are not reported.  
 
Panel A FAMILY = family firm indicator, coded as 1 for firms where founding family members 
continue to hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders, 0 
otherwise 
  Dependent variables 







Intercept  0.365 0.370  -0.025 -0.043 
  (46.55) (20.01)  (-4.40) (-6.92) 
Family firm indicator  0.005 0.012  -0.006 -0.004 
  (2.24) (2.23)  (-3.67) (-2.01) 
ROA  0.039 -0.070  0.187 0.133 
  (2.97) (-2.29)  (21.28) (14.11) 
Leverage  0.010 -0.078  0.019 -0.001 
  (1.39) (-4.69)  (3.71) (-0.20) 
NOL dummy  -0.001 -0.024  0.009 0.011 
  (-0.41) (-3.48)  (4.09) (5.05) 
Change in NOL  0.650 1.138  -0.459 -0.414 
  (8.41) (6.55)  (-9.30) (-7.77) 
Foreign income  -0.250 -0.221  0.608 0.698 
  (-7.15) (-2.66)  (21.53) (22.90) 
PPE  -0.005 -0.026  0.006 0.051 
  (-0.78) (-1.83)  (1.35) (10.67) 
Intangible assets  0.071 0.099  -0.005 0.007 
  (9.43) (5.60)  (-0.90) (1.23) 
Equity income  -1.096 -1.059  -0.455 -0.638 
  (-4.20) (-1.73)  (-2.33) (-3.04) 
Firm size  -0.002 -0.001  0.001 0.000 
  (-1.98) (-0.71)  (2.36) (0.59) 
Market-to-book  0.000 -0.001  -0.002 -0.001 
  (-0.45) (-1.28)  (-6.60) (-2.05) 
Lagged book-tax difference     0.261 0.216 
     (17.34) (13.32) 
       
Year dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  19.9 12.5  49.0 47.0 
N  3,630 3,630  3,130 3,124 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B FAMILY = founding family equity ownership 
 
  Dependent variables 







Intercept  0.355 0.358  -0.030 -0.043 
  (40.70) (19.86)  (-5.36) (-7.48) 
Family ownership  0.020 0.058  -0.003 -0.007 
  (2.58) (3.60)  (-0.66) (-1.44) 
ROA  0.045 -0.050  0.189 0.129 
  (3.09) (-1.66)  (21.42) (14.26) 
Leverage  0.011 -0.078  0.023 -0.001 
  (1.39) (-4.74)  (4.44) (-0.14) 
NOL dummy  -0.001 -0.024  0.008 0.011 
  (-0.23) (-3.49)  (3.97) (5.27) 
Change in NOL  0.694 1.072  -0.456 -0.413 
  (8.10) (6.26)  (-9.20) (-8.17) 
Foreign income  -0.247 -0.234  0.605 0.708 
  (-6.25) (-2.87)  (21.35) (24.50) 
PPE  -0.003 -0.022  0.005 0.049 
  (-0.49) (-1.57)  (1.13) (10.74) 
Intangible assets  0.076 0.100  -0.006 0.006 
  (8.88) (5.73)  (-1.18) (1.04) 
Equity income  -1.431 -1.013  -0.426 -0.539 
  (-4.90) (-1.68)  (-2.18) (-2.70) 
Firm size  -0.001 0.000  0.002 0.001 
  (-0.77) (-0.07)  (3.04) (1.04) 
Market-to-book  0.000 -0.002  -0.002 -0.001 
  (-0.62) (-1.64)  (-6.86) -1.72) 
Lagged book-tax difference     0.263 0.212 
     (17.44) (13.64) 
       
Year dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  17.5 12.7  49.0 49.8 
N  3,630 3,630  3,130 3,124 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel C FAMILY = family firm indicator for firms with family equity ownershipt5% 
 
  Dependent Variables 







Intercept  0.346 0.343  -0.030 -0.042 
  (36.55) (21.71)  (-5.06) (-7.20) 
Family blockholder  0.005 0.015  -0.003 -0.003 
  (1.63) (3.10)  (-1.81) (-1.82) 
ROA  0.048 0.048  0.204 0.130 
  (3.08) (1.83)  (22.55) (14.31) 
Leverage  0.006 -0.076  0.025 -0.001 
  (0.71) (-5.32)  (4.78) (-0.18) 
NOL dummy  0.000 -0.022  0.008 0.011 
  (0.06) (-3.78)  (3.81) (5.24) 
Change in NOL  0.736 0.779  -0.452 -0.414 
  (8.00) (5.02)  (-8.76) (-8.19) 
Foreign income  -0.231 -0.221  0.593 0.708 
  (-5.40) (-3.14)  (20.14) (24.48) 
PPE  0.001 -0.022  0.003 0.048 
  (0.07) (-1.78)  (0.74) (10.70) 
Intangible assets  0.077 0.090  -0.010 0.006 
  (8.42) (5.88)  (-1.74) (1.06) 
Equity income  -1.555 -0.790  -0.526 -0.544 
  (-4.92) (-1.52)  (-2.59) (-2.73) 
Firm size  0.000 0.000  0.002 0.001 
  (-0.39) (-0.03)  (2.86) (0.86) 
Market-to-book  0.000 -0.002  -0.002 0.000 
  (-0.91) (-2.68)  (-6.54) (-1.64) 
Lagged book-tax difference     0.251 0.212 
     (16.09) (13.69) 
       
Year dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES  YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  15.5 14.6  47.3 49.8 
N  3,630 3,630  3,130 3,124 
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Table 5 
The Effects of External Monitoring and External Financing 
on Family Firms’ Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Panel A External Monitoring 
Model:  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 1
13 , 1 14 , 1
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
TaxAgg FAMILY EXTMON FAMILY EXTMON ROA LEV
NOL NOL FI PPE INTANG EQINC SIZE
MB BTD Year Dummies Industry Dummies
D E E E E E




    u  
  '     
     ,i t
 
 
External monitoring (EXTMONi,t) is an indicator variable coded as 1 for firms with long-term 
institutional holders (per Gaspar et al. 2005). See the Appendix for the definition of all other 
variables. For each variable, the t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. Year and industry 
dummies are included in each specification and for the sake of brevity, the results for these 
dummies and control variables are not reported. 
 
  Dependent Variables 





Intercept  0.365 0.368 -0.025 -0.042 
  (46.32) (20.03) (-4.34) (-6.75) 
Family firm indicator  0.007 0.016 -0.008 -0.005 
  (2.83) (2.70) (-3.97) (-2.66) 
External monitoring dummy  0.003 0.018 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.97) (2.37) (-0.01) (-0.40) 
Family firm indicator u  
External monitoring dummy  -0.010 -0.018 0.006 0.008 
  (-2.06) (-1.54) (1.73) (1.89) 
 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  20.0 12.6 48.7 47.1 
N  3,630 3,630 3,130 3,124 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
  
Panel B External Financing 
 
Model:  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 1
13 , 1 14 , 1
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
TaxAgg FAMILY EXTFIN FAMILY EXTFIN ROA LEV
NOL NOL FI PPE INTANG EQINC SIZE
MB BTD Year Dummies Industry Dummies
D E E E E E




    u  
  '     
     ,i t
 
External financing (EXTFINi,t) is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the family firm raised capital 
(per SDC database) in year t+1. See the Appendix for the definition of all other variables. For 
each variable, the t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. Year and industry dummies are 
included in each specification and for the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies and the 
control variables are not reported. 
 
  Dependent Variables 





Intercept  0.373 0.363 -0.029 -0.044 
  (64.31) (19.22) (-4.46) (-7.09) 
Family firm indicator  0.006 0.010 -0.004 -0.001 
  (3.13) (1.76) (-1.89) (-0.68) 
External financing dummy  -0.004 -0.015 0.007 0.003 
  (-1.53) (-1.85) (2.45) (1.11) 
Family firms u  
External financing Dummy  0.008 0.004 -0.008 -0.011 
  (1.95) (0.34) (-1.81) (-2.49) 
 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  21.8 12.5 49.4 47.1 




The Effects of Professional CEO, Founder CEO, Descendant CEO,  
Outside Blockholders, and CEO % Ownership 
on Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Panel A The incremental effects of Professional CEO, Founder CEO, and Descendant CEO  
 
Model:  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,
10 , 11 , 12 , 1 13 , 1 14 , 1
_ _ _i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
TaxAgg FAM PCEO FOUNDER CEO DESC CEO
ROA LEV NOL NOL FI PPE
INTANG EQINC SIZE MB BTD
Year Dummies Industry Dummies
D E E E
E E E E E E
E E E E E  
   
    '  
    
  ,i tH
  
 
FAM_PCEOi,t is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the family firm hires a non-family CEO, 
FOUNDER_CEOi,t is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the CEO is the founder of the firm, 
DESC_CEOi,t is an indicator coded as 1 if the CEO is a descendant of the firm founder. See the 
Appendix for the definition of all other variables. For each variable, the t-statistic is reported in 
the parenthesis. Year dummies and industry dummies are included in each specification and for 
the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies and the control variables are not reported. 
 
  Dependent Variables 





Intercept  0.367 0.365 -0.026 -0.042 
  (46.18) (19.89) (-4.47) (-6.92) 
Professional CEO dummy  0.005 0.019 -0.007 -0.003 
  (1.61) (2.81) (-3.26) (-1.17) 
Founder CEO dummy  0.007 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 
  (2.29) (-0.34) (-3.86) (-2.82) 
Descendant CEO dummy  0.000 0.020 0.000 0.001 
  (0.014) (2.23) (0.06) (0.36) 
      
Control variables  YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  19.9 12.6 49.1 47.1 
N  3,630 3,630 3,130 3,124 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B The incremental impact of outside blockholders 
 
Model:  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 1
12 , 1 13 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
TaxAgg FAMILY BLOCKHOLDER ROA LEV NOL
NOL FI PPE INTANG EQINC SIZE
MB BTD Year Dummies Industry Dummies
D E E E E E




     
 '     
    
 
 
BLOCKHOLDERi,t is an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm has an outside blockholder (i.e., 
a non-family, non-insider blockholder). See the Appendix for the definition of all other variables. 
For each variable, the t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. Year dummies and industry 
dummies are included in each specification and for the sake of brevity, the results for these 
dummies and the control variables are not reported. 
 
  Dependent Variables 





Intercept  0.367 0.377 -0.025 -0.041 
  (43.48) (19.01) (-3.97) (-6.18) 
Family firm indicator  0.005 0.010 -0.006 -0.004 
  (2.13) (1.78) (-3.66) (-2.07) 
Outside blockholder indicator  -0.002 -0.012 -0.000 -0.001 
  (-0.69) (-1.99) (-0.22) (-0.53) 
 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  19.9 12.5 49.0 47.0 





Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel C The incremental impact of CEO % equity ownership 
 
Model:  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 1 12 , 1 13 , 1
,
_i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
TaxAgg FAMILY CEO OWN ROA LEV NOL NOL
FI PPE INTANG EQINC SIZE MB BTD
Year Dummies Industry Dummies
D E E E E E E
E E E E E E E
H
  
       '




CEO_OWNi,t is the CEO‟s percentage equity ownership. See the Appendix for the definition of 
all other variables. For each variable, the t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. Year dummies 
and industry dummies are included in each specification and for the sake of brevity, the results 
for these dummies and the control variables are not reported. 
 
  Dependent Variables 





Intercept  0.366 0.371 -0.027 -0.043 
  (44.99) (19.39) (-4.60) (-6.68) 
Family firm indicator  0.005 0.010 -0.005 -0.004 
  (2.04) (1.84) (-3.08) (-1.93) 
CEO equity ownership  -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.31) (-0.73) (1.37) (-0.03) 
 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies  YES YES YES YES 
 
Adj. R2 (%)  19.9 12.5 49.1 47.0 
N  3,630 3,630 3,130 3,124 
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Table 7 
Analysis using the Common Factor of the Four Tax Aggressiveness Measures  
 
Model: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 1 11 , 1 12 , 1
,
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t
TaxAgg FAMILY ROA LEV NOL NOL FI PPE
INTANG EQINC SIZE MB BTD
Year Dummies Industry Dummies
D E E E E E E E
E E E E E
H
  
      '  




The tax aggressiveness measure is a common factor extracted from effective tax rate, cash 
effective tax rate, Manzon-Plesko book-tax difference, and Desai-Dharmapla book-tax difference. 
See the Appendix for the definition of other variables. Year and industry dummies are included 
and for the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies are not reported.  
 
  Coefficients T-statistics  
Intercept  -0.591 -6.53  
     
Family firm indicator  -0.049 -1.87  
     
ROA  0.837 5.59  
     
Leverage  0.142 1.74  
     
NOL dummy  0.111 3.38  
     
Change in NOL  -6.112 -7.14  
     
Foreign income  10.285 23.45  
     
PPE  0.425 6.18  
     
Intangible assets  -0.149 -1.74  
     
Equity income  -5.858 -1.91  
     
Firm size  -0.016 -1.64  
     
Market-to-book  0.011 2.41  
     
Year dummies  YES   
Industry dummies  YES   
 
Adj. R2 (%)  44.6   




Firm Level Analysis of Family Firms’ Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i
TaxAgg FAMILY ROA LEV NOL NOL FI PPE
INTANG EQINC SIZE MB Industry Dummies
D E E E E E E E
E E E E H
      '  
        
 
See the Appendix for the definition of variables. All variables are five-year averages in the 
sample period. For each variable, the t-statistic is reported in the parenthesis. Industry dummies 
are included in each specification and for the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies are 
not reported. 
 
  Dependent Variables  





Intercept  0.372 0.393  -0.004 -0.042  
  (27.27) (16.15)  (-1.82) (-5.49)  
Family firm indicator  0.011 0.005  -0.004 -0.005  
  (2.58) (0.61)  (-1.72) (-2.12)  
ROA  -0.028 0.050  0.112 0.073  
  (-0.76) (0.76)  (5.19) (3.67)  
Leverage  0.003 -0.093  0.029 0.004  
  (0.14) (-2.74)  (2.60) (0.40)  
NOL dummy  0.005 -0.020  0.005 0.003  
  (1.08) (-2.26)  (1.74) (1.21)  
Change in NOL  0.062 -0.043  -0.175 -0.114  
  (0.99) (-0.38)  (-5.08) (-3.04)  
Foreign income  -0.368 -0.036  1.082 1.050  
  (-4.19) (-0.23)  (20.42) (20.98)  
PPE  -0.015 -0.071  0.028 0.079  
  (-1.08) (-2.77)  (3.42) (9.86)  
Intangible assets  0.091 0.092  -0.013 0.023  
  (5.17) (2.89)  (-1.29) (2.30)  
Equity income  -0.499 -0.967  -0.889 -0.857  
  (-0.72) (-0.79)  (-2.17) (-2.16)  
Firm size  -0.002 -0.003  0.000 0.001  
  (-1.07) (-1.05)  (0.44) (0.85)  
Market-to-book  0.001 -0.005  -0.001 0.001  
  (0.99) (-3.58)  (-1.49) (1.67)  
        
Industry dummies  YES YES  YES YES  
 
Adj. R2 (%)  16.7 20.1  48.5 58.7  
N  910 910  695 695  
 
